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Abstract 
Active security is mainly concerned with performing one or more security functions 
when a host in a communication network is subject to an attack. Such security 
functions include appropriate actions against attackers. To properly afford active 
security actions a set of software subsystems should be integrated together so that 
they can automatically detect and appropriately address any vulnerability in the 
underlying network. 
 
This work presents integrated model for active security response model. The proposed 
model introduces Active Response Mechanism (ARM) for tracing anonymous attacks 
in the network back to their source. This work is motivated by the increased 
frequency and sophistication of denial-of-service attacks and by the difficulty in 
tracing packets with incorrect, or “spoofed”, source addresses. This paper presents 
within the proposed model two tracing approaches based on: 
• Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) for unauthorized access attacks. 
• Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) in the network for Denial of Service 
(DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.  
 
On the basis of the proposed model a cooperative network security tools such as 
firewall, intrusion detection system with IP tracing mechanism has been designed for 
taking a rapid active response against real IPs for attackers. The proposed model is 
able to detect network vulnerabilities, trace attack source IP and reconfigure the 
attacked subnetworks. 
 
Keywords - IP Tracing, Sleepy Watermark Tracing, Probabilistic Packet Marking, 
Active Security, Intrusion Detection System,  
 
1. Introduction  
Network attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack consume the resources of a 
remote host or network, thereby denying or degrading service to legitimate users. The 
main aim of a DoS is the disruption of services by attempting to limit access to a 
machine or service instead of subverting the service itself. This kind of attack aims at 
rendering a network incapable of providing normal service by targeting either the 
network’s bandwidth or its connectivity. Such attacks are among the hardest security 
problems to address because they are simple to implement, difficult to prevent, and 
very difficult to trace.  
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) attempts to detect intrusion through analysing 
observed system or network activities [Oh 2003]. Based on the type of observed 
activities, IDS can be classified as network-based or host-based. IDS will raise alarms 
when it has detected misuse or anomaly. It may also report intrusion by emailing or 
paging system administrator and even disconnected intrusion connection locally. 
However, IDS is passive and it gives little information about where the intrusion 
really comes from. 
 
Unfortunately, mechanisms for dealing with network attacks have not advanced at the 
same pace. Most work in this area has focused on tolerating attacks by reducing their 
effects on the victim [Spatscheck 1999][Banga 1999][Karn 1999]. This approach can 
provide an effective stop-gap measure, but does not eliminate the problem nor does it 
discourage attackers. The other option, and the focus of this paper, is to present active 
network model to trace attacks back to their origin then take appropriate action 
against attacker so they can be eliminated at the source.  
 
One of the biggest problems in computer security is “DDoS” Distributed Denial of 
Service. To take an important step towards the solution of such problem, the active 
network protection approach, in which not only the intruder is detected but also an 
action must be taken against it. Determining the source of an attack, which is called 
the traceback problem [Song 2000], is important for such active network protection 
approach. But it is surprisingly difficult due to the stateless nature of Internet routing. 
Attackers routinely disguise their location using incorrect, or “spoofed”, IP source 
addresses. As these packets traverse the Internet their true origin is lost and a victim is 
left with little useful information [Savage 2000]. While there are several tracing 
techniques in use, they all do not integrate with a complete active network model. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce a classification of 
existing tracing approaches. In Section 3 we describe existing schemes for combating 
anonymous attacks. Section 4 contains a description for the proposed model. Finally, 
we summarize our findings in Section 5. 
 
2. Tracing Approaches Classifications 
In general, tracing approaches for a connection chain can be divided into two 
categories: host-based and network-based, each of which can further be classified into 
either active or passive. Table (1) provides a classification of existing tracing 
approaches.  
 
Table (1): Classification of Existing Tracing Approaches and Sleepy 
Watermark Tracing (SWT) [Wang 2001] 
 Passive Active 
Host-based DIDS 
CIS 
Caller ID 
Network-based Thumbprinting 
Timing-Based 
Deviation-based 
IDIP 
SWT 
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Host-based tracing approaches depend on information collected from each host 
involved in the tracing. Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) attempts to 
keep track of all the users in the network and account for all activities to network-
wide intrusion detection systems [Oh 2003]. Each monitored host in the DIDS domain 
collects audit trails and sends audit abstracts to a centralized DIDS director for 
analysis. 
 
The caller Identification System (CIS) by [Jung 1993] is anther host-based tracing 
mechanism. Each host along the chain keeps a record about its view of the login chain 
so far. When the user from the n-/th host attempts to login into the nth host, the nth 
host asks the n-1th host about its view of the login chain of that user, which should be 
1,2 …n-1 ideally. The nth host then queries host n-1 to 1 about their views of the 
login chain as so on. Only when the login chain information from all queried hosts 
matches, will the login be granted at nth host. 
 
Caller ID, described by [Staniford-Chen 1995], is yet another interesting host-based 
approach that is said to be used by the Air Force. Caller ID is controversial in that it 
actually utilizes the same break-in technique used by intruders to break into hosts 
along the connection chain reversibly. If the intruder from Hi connects through H, 
H2…Hn-1 to the final target Hn, the network security personnel at Hn first breaks 
into Hn-1; from there they can find out the intruder comes from Hn-2, then they break 
into Hn-2 and so on. Eventually they can find the origin of the intruder. 
 
The fundamental problem with the host-based tracing approach is its trust model. 
Host-based tracing places its trust upon the monitored hosts themselves. In specific, it 
depends on the correlation of connections at every host in the connection chain. If one 
host is compromised and is providing misleading correlation information, the whole 
tracing system is fooled. Because host-based tracing requires participation and trust of 
every host involved in the network-based intrusion, it is very difficult to be applied in 
the context of the public Internet.  
 
Network-based tracing is the other category of tracing approaches. Neither does it 
require the participation of monitored hosts, nor does it place its trust on the 
monitored hosts. It is based on the property of network connections: the application 
level content of chained connections is invariant across the connection chain. In 
particular, the thumbprint [Staniford-Chen 1995] is a pioneering correlation technique 
that utilizes a small quantity of information to summarize connections. Ideally it can 
uniquely distinguish a connection from unrelated connections and correlate those 
related connections in the same connection chain. While thumb printing can be useful 
even when only part of the Internet implements it, it depends in clock synchronization 
to match thumbprints of corresponding intervals of connections. It also is vulnerable 
to retransmission variation. This severely limits its usefulness in real-time tracing. 
 
Active network protection approach must be taken against intruder, must be followed.   
• In order to take an appropriate action against the attacker, it must be identified, in 
other words, whether the attacking IP is a masked IP or it is a real IP. 
• Distinguishing Between the masked IP and the Real IP helps us to take the 
appropriate action against the proper attacker not the wrong one. 
• Many Approaches can be used to identify the real IP from the masked IP such as 
watermark tracing approach and statistical approach. 
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Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) is a way to address the problem of network-
based intrusion. In other words, SWT has the ability to effectively trace the detected 
intrusion that utilizes stepping stone to disguise its origin at real-time, and 
dynamically push the intrusion countermeasures such as remote monitoring, blocking, 
containment and isolation close to the source of the intrusion [Wang 2001].  
 
SWT identified the following assumptions that motivate and constrain the design: 
• Intrusions are interactive and bi-directional,  
• Routers are trust worthy and hosts are not trust worthy,  
• Each host a single SWT guarding gateway and  
• There is no link-to-link encryption.  
 
The first two assumptions represent the assessments of the nature of intrusions. In 
SWT approach, intrusions are those attacks aiming to gain unauthorized access, 
rather than denial of service attacks.  The compromised router needs to be addressed 
first, before the tracing of the intrusion can go any further. The assumption of each 
host having a single SWT guardian gateway is only for simplifying, in case some host 
has multiple SWT guardian gateways, the guardian gateway set will be used in SWT 
tracing. The final assumption represents the inherent limitation of any tracing based 
on network content. SWT supposes a correlation of encrypted connections in real-
time is still an open problem. 
 
Without effective intrusion source tracing, intrusion response is limited to the nearby 
of intrusion target and is passive in front of network-based intrusions. On the other 
hand, effective intrusion source tracing enables us to build a more active and dynamic 
intrusion response by pushing the intrusion countermeasures near the source of 
network-based intrusions.  
 
Automatic and network-wide intrusion responses can be built on SWT guardian 
gateway by applying active network principles [Wang 2001]: 
• Remote monitoring and surveillance.  
• Remote decoy and trap. 
• Remote blocking and containment.  
• Remote isolation and quarantine.  
• Dynamic perimeter defense.  
While these examples of active intrusion response are based on SWT. The proposed 
model uses SWT as a real-time intrusion source tracing. 
 
3. Existing Schemes  
There have been several efforts to reduce the anonymity afforded by IP spoofing. 
Table (2) provides a subjective characterization of each of these approaches in terms 
of management cost, additional network load, overhead on the router, the ability to 
trace multiple simultaneous attacks, and the ability trace attacks after they have 
completed.  
 
3.1 Ingress filtering 
Obviously, the best way to address the problem of anonymous attacks is to eliminate 
the ability to forge source addresses. One such approach, frequently called ingress 
filtering, is to configure routers to block packets that arrive with illegitimate source 
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addresses [Ferguson 1998]. This requires a router with sufficient power to examine 
the source address of every packet and sufficient knowledge to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate addresses. Consequently, ingress filtering is most feasible 
at the border of Internet Service Providers (ISP) where address ownership is relatively 
unambiguous and traffic load is low. As traffic is aggregated from multiple ISPs into 
transit networks, there is no longer enough information to unambiguously determine if 
a packet arriving on a particular interface has a “legal” source address. Moreover, on 
such high speed links the overhead of comparing every packet to a filter list becomes 
prohibitive. 
 
Table (2): Qualitative comparison of existing schemes for combating 
anonymous attacks [Savage 2000]. 
 Management 
overhead 
Network 
overhead
Router 
overhead
Distributed 
capability 
Post-
mortem 
capability
Ingress filtering 
Link testing 
Input debugging 
Controlled flooding 
Logging 
Marking 
Moderate 
 
High 
Low 
 
High 
Low 
Low 
 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
Low 
Moderate 
 
High 
Low 
 
High 
Low 
N/A 
 
Good 
Poor 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
N/A 
 
Poor 
Poor 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
The principal problem with ingress filtering is that its effectiveness depends on 
widespread, if not universal, deployment. Unfortunately, a significant fraction of 
ISPs, perhaps the majority, do not implement this service – either because they are 
uninformed or have been discouraged by the administrative burden1, potential router 
overhead and complications with services like Mobile IP [Perkins 1996]. A secondary 
problem is that even if ingress filtering were universally deployed at the customer-to-
ISP level, attackers could still forge addresses from the hundreds or thousands of 
hosts within a valid customer network [Ferguson 1998].  
 
3.2 Link testing 
Most existing traceback techniques start from the router closest to the victim and 
interactively test its upstream links until they determine which one is used to carry the 
attacker's traffic. Ideally, this procedure is repeated recursively on the upstream router 
until the source is reached. This technique assumes that an attack remains active until 
the completion of a trace and is therefore inappropriate for attacks that are detected 
after the fact, attacks that occur intermittently, or attacks that modulate their behavior 
in response to a traceback. There are two varieties of link testing schemes, input 
debugging and controlled flooding. 
 
3.2.1 Input debugging 
Some routers include a feature called input debugging that allows an operator to filter 
particular packets on some egress port and determine which ingress port they arrived 
on. This capability is used to implement a trace as follows: First, the victim must 
recognize that it is being attacked and develop an attack signature that describes a 
common feature contained in all the attack packets. The victim communicates this 
signature to a network operator, frequently via telephone, who then installs a 
corresponding input debugging filter on the victim's upstream egress port. This filter 
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reveals the associated input port, and hence which upstream router originated the 
traffic. The process is then repeated recursively on the upstream router, until the 
originating site is reached or the trace leaves the ISP's border (and hence its 
administrative control over the routers).  
 
3.2.2 Controlled flooding 
Burch and Cheswick have developed a link testing traceback technique that does not 
require any support from network operators [Burch 2000]. This technique can be 
called controlled flooding because it tests links by flooding them with large bursts of 
traffic and observing how this perturbs traffic from the attacker. Using a pregenerated 
“map” of Internet topology, the victim coerces selected hosts along the upstream route 
into iteratively flooding each incoming link on the router closest to the victim. Since 
router buffers are shared, packets traveling across the loaded link – including any sent 
by the attacker – have an increased probability of being dropped. 
By observing changes in the rate of packets received from the attacker, the victim can 
therefore infer which link they arrived from.  
 
3.3 Logging 
An approach suggested in [Sager 1998] and [Stone 1999] is to log packets at key 
routers and then use data mining techniques to determine the path that the packets 
traversed. This scheme has the useful property that it can trace an attack long after the 
attack has completed (see Figure (1)). In Figure (1) network as seen from the victim 
of an attack, V. Routers are represented by Ri, and potential attackers by Ai. The 
dotted line represents a particular attack path between an attacker and the victim 
[Savage 2000]. However, it also has obvious drawbacks, including enormous resource 
requirements and a large-scale inter-provider database integration problem.  
 
A1       A2    A3 
 
 
R5     R6     R7 
 
 
      R3          R4 
 
 
  R2 
 
 
 
 
   R1 
 
 
 
    V 
Figure (1): Network attack path between an attacker and the victim [Savage 2000]. 
 
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) is a traceback algorithm [Savage 2000]. It is 
motivated by the increased frequency and sophistication of denial-of-service attacks 
and by the difficulty in tracing packets with incorrect, or “spoofed”, source addresses. 
This approach allows a victim to identify the network path(s) traversed by an attacker 
without requiring interactive operational support from Internet Service Providers 
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(ISPs). Moreover, this traceback can be performed “post-mortem” – after an attack 
has completed. In the proposed model we suggest use the PPM algorithm for denial-
of-service attacks because it is compatible and can be efficiently implemented using 
conventional technology.  
 
4. IP Tracing and Active Response Model 
The proposed model, as such, exploits technologies and techniques already in 
existence. It provides a suitable infrastructure that can perform rapid response to 
attacks. Moreover it uses different tracing approach to identify the real IP address for 
the attacking host. This model consists of both Passive Protection Mechanism (PPM) 
and Active Response Mechanism (ARM) integrated together in one model as shown 
in Figure (2).  
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4.1 Passive Protection Mechanism 
Detecting the attacks without taking any actions is called “Passive Network 
Protection”. It takes many different forms such as firewall, access control and 
intrusion detection systems.  
A Firewall provides controlled access between a private network and the Internet. It 
intercepts each message between the private network and the Internet. Depending on 
the configuration, the firewall determines whether the data packet or a connection 
request should be permitted to pass through the firewall or be discarded. But there are 
several types of security exposures to private networks that a firewall cannot address: 
• Internal Intrusion: the firewall cannot protect the resources from attack by an 
internal user of the private networks. 
• Direct Internet traffic: The firewall cannot protect he resources of the private 
network from the traffic that takes place directly with the Internet. 
• Virus Protection: A firewall cannot protect a private network from an external 
virus. A virus may be transferred to the private network using (FTP) file transfer 
protocol or other means. 
 
The best intrusion prevention system will fail. A system second line of defense is 
intrusion detection. Intrusion detection is identified using the following approaches: 
• Statistical Anomaly Detection 
• Rule-Based Detection 
 
PPM based on two popular protection systems firewall and intrusion detection. 
Firewall used as first line of defense to filter both incoming and outgoing packets 
according to organization policy. Intrusion detection system used as a second line of 
defense in order to detect both external intruder from outside the underlying network 
and internal intruder inside underlying network.  
 
4.2 Active Response Mechanism 
Recently the computer user has become far better informed than ever, but as networks 
get bigger and bigger more naive users are introduced. Some of them are unwittingly 
causing many security gaps. At the same time, today’s the hacker is more well 
informed too, and increasingly able to take advantage of those gaps and get inside the 
target network.  
 
Therefore, we have to be diligent in cleaning up the security holes as they arise. 
Unfortunately, the increasing burden of maintaining network security is squeezing 
already overburdened system administrators. Existing passive security analysis tools 
generate too much data that takes too much work to parse.  
 
The fundamental problem with passive security trends is the huge amount of required 
computations. Because such systems passively monitor the network traffic, they have 
to record all the concurrent incoming and outgoing connections even when there is no 
intrusion to trace. To correlate relevant events at any host they need to match every 
incoming connection with every outgoing connection of that host. Thus, for a host 
with m concurrent incoming connections and n concurrent outgoing connections, the 
passive intrusion detection tool would take O(m x n) comparisons, in addition to the 
O(m+n) recording of concurrent connections. Moreover, it needs a further human 
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decision and a manual action, such as running a firewall program to shut down a 
particular network port. 
 
Active Response Mechanism (ARM) contains two modules Tracing Module (TM) 
and Response Module (RM).  
 
TM in this work consists of two cooperative tracing modules. First is Sleepy 
Watermark Tracing (SWT). Second is Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) algorithm. 
In SWT module, intrusions are those attacks aiming to gain unauthorized access, 
rather than denial of service attacks.  The compromised router needs to be addressed 
first, before the tracing of the intrusion can go any further. In this case SWT can still 
trace to the farthest trustworthy guardian gateway. 
 
PPM algorithm used for denial-of-service attacks because it is compatible and can be 
efficiently implemented using conventional technology. This class of algorithm, best 
embodied in edge sampling, can enable efficient and robust multi-party traceback that 
can be incrementally deployed and efficiently implemented.  
 
TM archive spoofed (masked) IPs into a database.  Spoofed (masked) IPs database 
used to improve tracing algorithms when the same attack source IP comes back. 
   
RM receives real attacker source address from TM. RM is responsible for taken 
appropriate action against attacker. Such actions may range from just warning to 
blocking his traffic or even attacking some of his resources. Some times these actions 
may be firewall reconfiguration such as deny access for certain IP or range of IPs or 
closing certain port like FTP port. Also, some times these actions may be changing 
file or system or account permissions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The concept of active security that exploits active networking principles can offer a 
wide range of opportunities to build better security systems. In this paper, we have 
argued that existing tracing intrusion defense approaches. We have proposed a more 
active response paradigm to help to better repel or eliminate network-based intrusions 
and have identified the need of effective network-wide intrusion source tracing in 
order to build automated, network-wide response system.  
 
The proposed model can do the following tasks:   
• An active response mechanism to afford appropriate actions against the real 
intruder. Such actions may range from just warning to blocking his traffic or 
even attacking some of his resources. 
• Protection of other network targets from being victimed by the same intruder. 
 
This paper presented SWT [Wang 2001] as an example of network-wide intrusion 
tracing capability built upon SWT to dynamically push the intrusion defense 
perimeter close to the source of network-based intrusion. Also, we have argued that 
denial-of-service attacks motivate the development of improved traceback capabilities 
and we have suggested traceback algorithms based on packet marking in the network 
[Savage 2000].  
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• SWT approach, intrusions are those attacks aiming to gain unauthorized 
access, rather than denial of service attacks.   
• PPM algorithm for both Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks. 
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